Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 23031-3-II
Title of Case: Charles & Jackie Price, Appellants
v.
State of Washington, Respondent
File Date: 07/16/1999
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Superior Court of Clark County
Docket No: 94-2-04626-1
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 02/09/1998
Judge signing: Hon. Barbara D. Johnson
JUDGES
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Authored by Karen G. Seinfeld
Concurring: J. Dean Morgan
Carroll C. Bridgewater
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
Philip J. Buri
Brett & Daugert
300 N Commercial St
Bellingham, WA 98227-5008
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Jefffrey A. Freimund
Ofc of Atty Gen Torts Div
P.O. Box 40126
Olympia, WA 98504-0126
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
CHARLES and JACKIE PRICE, No. 23031-3-II
husband
and wife; CHRISTOPHER RYAN
PRICE,
a minor child, by CHARLES and
JACKIE
PRICE, his co-guardians ad
litem;
KIMBERLY RENE PRICE, a minor
child,
by CHARLES and JACKIE PRICE,
her
co-guardians ad litem,
Appellants,
v.
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, PUBLISHED OPINION
Respondent. Filed:
Seinfeld, J. - Charles and Jackie Price sued the State of Washington for
wrongful adoption, contending that the State Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS) failed to disclose relevant information about their
adopted son. The trial court dismissed the action on the State's summary
judgment motion, concluding that the statute of limitations barred the
lawsuit. The Prices appeal. Finding disputed issues of material fact as
to when the Prices knew or could have known the factual basis for their
claim, we reverse.
FACTS
When the Prices contacted DSHS about adopting a child, they explained to
the caseworker that their own severely handicapped child, who had Down's
syndrome, suffered a painful death and they were interested only in a
physically, mentally, and emotionally healthy child. In April 1981, the
caseworker contacted the Prices and told them about C., a 20-month old boy
who was available for adoption.
The caseworker gave the Prices only the following documents: an Adoptive
Child Registration; a Child's Medical Report; and a letter dated November
4, 1980, from Dr. Isaac Pope to C.'s DSHS caseworker. The Adoptive Child
Registration contained this description of C.:
{C.} is now a very happy child who enjoys the older children in the foster
home plus all the attention he receives. . . . {C.} is still a bit insecure
and will likely have some adjustment problems in going into an adoptive
home. He was diagnosed as failure to thrive at 2 months and has been in
foster care since.
Clerk's Papers at 415. The Registration listed C.'s mental functioning and
motor development as average.
The family medical history portion of the Child's Medical Report indicated
the following:
{C.'s} mother has had severe psychological problems since childhood, came
from an abusive situation. {C.'s} maternal grandmother and great
grandmother had diabetes. {C.'s} father has four brothers who are slightly
to moderately retarded.
Clerk's Papers at 417-18. The Report also indicated that C.'s mother had
been suicidal and had two maternal uncles who committed suicide.
The treatment portion of the Medical Report indicated that C. had been
hospitalized at two-and-a-half months and subsequently received physical
therapy for several months; the final diagnosis was gross motor delay
because of under stimulation and/or malnutrition. The Report indicated,
however, that his "growth and development" as of March 1981 was
"{n}ormal." Dr. Pope's letter indicated that, in his opinion, C.'s gross
motor delay was a result of under stimulation and/or maltreatment and,
thus, a previous cerebral palsy diagnosis should be eliminated from C.'s
records.
After reviewing these documents, the Prices discussed the implications of
C.'s family medical history with the caseworker who, according to Mr.
Price, assured them that C. was not retarded and that the birth mother's
problems were due to an abusive environment. Thus, those problems would
not recur in C. The caseworker also told the Prices that she had provided
all the relevant information that she had received regarding C. Relying on
the caseworker's and Dr. Pope's assurances that C. was normal, the Prices
adopted him in October 1981.
During the two years following C.'s adoption, C.'s pediatrician observed no
abnormalities and noted he appeared normal. In 1984, when C. was five
years old, a neurologist evaluated him and prescribed a medication for
hyperactivity, although he concluded that C. had no evidence of
neurological defects. Then when C. was about eight or nine, a psychologist
diagnosed him as having a conduct disorder.
As C. grew older, his conduct became increasingly destructive and
uncontrollable. He physically assaulted his parents, punched holes and
wrote graffiti on the walls in his room, set fires, mistreated animals, and
cut himself with a razor. Although medical specialists prescribed numerous
medications, they were not able to explain what was wrong with C. Finally,
in 1994, when C. was about 14 years old, medical specialists at Oregon
Health Sciences University diagnosed him as suffering from fetal alcohol
effects.
Meanwhile, during the time C.'s problems were developing, the Prices
repeatedly sought more information from DSHS about C.'s biological parents.
After each request, DSHS either assured the Prices that they had all the
available records or told them that the records were closed.
Eventually, the Prices hired a lawyer to assist them in obtaining special
education services for C. In 1989, DSHS provided the Prices with 16
additional pages of documents including:
(1) C.'s hospital birth records indicating that he was a "normal" male
infant in good condition on discharge although "small for dates" and
jaundiced. These records indicate that the mother did not use drugs during
pregnancy; the inquiry regarding alcohol use is blank.
(2) Dr. Penalver's handwritten treatment notes regarding C.'s
hospitalization at Good Samaritan Hospital when he was two-and-a-half
months old.
(3) an evaluation report, dated November 1979, by C.'s occupational
therapist at Good Samaritan Hospital. The foster mother had reported that
C. had been left unattended for 48 hours. When he was first taken to the
receiving home, his body was "stiff all over and his hands were tightly
fisted." The foster mother also reported that at times C.'s whole left
side "seems to tighten up and becomes less resistant to movement." The
therapist summarized as follows:
it is felt that this is a developmentally at risk child who would benefit
from being in a stimulating and caring environment. Considering the
emotional and nutritional insult that this child has had to his system, it
is not uncommon to have residual increased tone. Hopefully, this abnormal
tone will diminish. In the meantime it is felt that this child should be
monitored on a twice monthly basis.
Clerk's Papers at 450.
(4) a letter from C.'s therapist to Dr. Penalver, dated December 1979,
indicating that C. was doing surprisingly well but expressing some concern
about his condition. The therapist specifically states: "I feel quite
leary {sic} about this developmentally 'at risk' child going back to his
original home at this point."
(5) a letter from C.'s child welfare caseworker to Dr. Florence
Greff, dated December 1979, where the caseworker states:
From what information I have been able to gather, this family has had a lot
of problems in the past. {C.'s biological mother} evidently spent some
time at Western State Hospital and Maple Lane School, and alludes to
several suicide attempts and drug usage in the past. . . .
When {C.} was placed in care, he appeared to be undersized, and rather
listless and unresponsive. When seen by a physician a few days after
placement, he was found to be 9 lbs. 2 oz., which he stated was below the
third percentile for his age. . . . Since being in care, {C.} has
flourished, and gained 3 lbs. 4 oz. in a little less than 4 weeks. He is
also far more responsive than he was at first. He has been found to have
cerebral palsy (which evidently affects his left side) and is receiving
periodic physical therapy for this.
Clerk's Papers at 449.
(6) a progress report and discharge summary prepared by C.'s occupational
therapist at Good Samaritan Hospital dated March 1980. The therapist
recommends that C. be seen by "either a physical therapist or an
occupational therapist who is neurodevelopmentally trained."
About 1990 or 1991, when C. was about 11 years old, the Prices attended a
seminar regarding fetal alcohol effect or fetal alcohol syndrome and
concluded that this was a "possible" explanation for C.'s problems. At the
seminar, the Prices met adoptive parents who were in litigation "trying to
find out what really had happened to their adoptive children." According
to Mr. Price, at least one person was alleging that DSHS had not provided
adequate information.
In July 1991, the Prices applied for public assistance under the Adoption
Support Reconsideration Program. They listed C.'s special needs as
hyperactivity, attention deficit disorder, and "possible" fetal alcohol or
drug syndrome. In September 1991, the Prices wrote an angry letter to DSHS
caseworkers "relinquishing" their custody and liability for C. to the State
and stating "we where {sic} not told of {C.'s} problems when he was adopted
nor {were} we offered any adoption support to help him." In 1992, the
Prices continued to request any and all files on C. "that relate to his
condition both Physical and Mental before and after his adoption in
{1981}."
Finally, in July 1994, DSHS turned over C.'s entire 300-page file to the
Prices. In this file, the Prices discovered for the first time the
existence and name of C.'s biological aunt, Rebecca Ketchum.1 The adoption
file also contained a Guardian Ad Litem's (GAL) report for a June 1980
review hearing and a Dependency Review Report dated September 1980. The
GAL's report includes the following statement:
Future prognosis is difficult at this time, but considering ongoing and
consistent care and follow up, {C.} has the potential to be "mildly or
minimally" disordered. Most likely having some difficulties with athletic
movements such as running. He should overcome his neurological disorders,
but will probably always appear not quite normal.
Clerk's Papers at 432. The Dependency Review Report states:
{C.'s mother} has indicated that she wishes to sign relinquishment papers
on {C.}, releasing him for adoption. She states that she and {C.} are not
bonded to each other and feels unable to provide care for a handicapped
child.
Clerk's Papers at 427.
In December 1994, five months after receiving C.'s complete case file,
the Prices filed suit against the State alleging negligence, fraud, and
breach of contract.2 In support of their negligence claim, the Prices
alleged that DSHS breached its statutory duty to disclose all potentially
relevant information about C.'s "medical condition, history and
circumstances that might indicate that he was not or might not be a
healthy, normal child." They further alleged that they would not have
adopted C. if DSHS had disclosed all such relevant information.
During discovery, Ketchum advised the Prices that she had communicated the
following information to a DSHS caseworker during the time period when DSHS
was first placing C. in foster care:
(1) C.'s birth mother had previously been a patient at Western State
Hospital, Maple Lane, and other treatment facilities;
(2) Since the age of 11, the birth mother had been a "hard core drug
addict" and, during her pregnancy with C., took drugs including heroin,
LSD, cocaine, and speed;
(3) Although Ketchum did not see the birth mother drink alcohol during her
pregnancy, she had seen her drunk and was "sure" that she drank because
"{t}his would have been consistent with her out-of-control lifestyle."
(4) The doctors told Ketchum that "C. was born with a serious handicap"
and that he either had a stroke, lesions on the brain, or cerebral palsy.
(5) Upon learning that the birth mother was a heroin addict, C.'s doctors
told Ketchum that, in their opinion, C.'s handicaps were caused by the
mother's drug use during pregnancy.
The State moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations
and on the merits. The State claimed that more than three years before
filing suit, the Prices knew or should have known that the alleged wrongful
act of incomplete disclosure had occurred. The State relied upon the
following evidence:
(1) Jackie Price's deposition testimony where she indicates that in 1989
DSHS provided previously undisclosed information;
(2) The Prices' September 1991 letter to DSHS where they express their
belief that DSHS did not tell them about C.'s problems;
(3) Mr. Price's deposition testimony about the seminar on fetal alcohol
syndrome or effect that the Prices attended in 1990 or 1991;
(4) the Prices' July 1991 application for public assistance where they
indicate that C. has "possible" fetal alcohol or drug syndrome.
In response, the Prices claimed that: (1) they did not learn critical
information that would have caused them not to adopt C. had it been
disclosed before the adoption until 1994; (2) because of DSHS's repeated
assurances of complete disclosure, they had no factual basis before 1994 to
conclude that DSHS had withheld material information; and (3) the 16 pages
of documents received in 1989 "only confirmed what we had been told earlier
about {C.'s} temporary physical problems." The trial court granted summary
judgment to the State, concluding that the Prices had discovered their
cause of action before December 1991, more than three years before filing
suit.
The Prices appeal contending that the issue of when they discovered the
factual basis for their cause of action was a disputed question of fact for
the jury. They further allege that they did not and could not have
discovered the birth mother's alcohol abuse during pregnancy until 1994
when DSHS disclosed its complete adoption file. The Prices also claim that
the State should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of
limitations because its caseworker gave "false assurances" that C. was a
normal healthy child and because the Prices diligently requested
information.
DISCUSSION
We review a decision granting summary judgment by engaging in the same
inquiry as the trial court. Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wn.2d
152, 157, 961 P.2d 371 (1998). Summary judgment is proper if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Schilling, 136 Wn.2d at 157; CR 56(c).
Summary judgment should be granted only if reasonable persons could reach
but one conclusion after considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wn.2d 491, 495,
951 P.2d 761 (1998).
A cause of action against an adoption agency for the negligent failure to
disclose medical and social information about the child falls within the
general three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2).3 Because both
parties have assumed that the discovery rule applies, we also assume its
applicability. See RAP 12.1(a); Allen v. State, 118 Wn.2d 753, 758 n.4,
826 P.2d 200 (1992).
Under the discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the
plaintiff knows, or through the exercise of due diligence, should have
known the essential elements of the cause of action. Allen, 118 Wn.2d at
757-58; Beard v. King County, 76 Wn. App. 863, 867, 889 P.2d 501 (1995).
The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant
facts, regardless of whether the plaintiff also knows that these facts
establish a legal cause of action. Allen, 118 Wn.2d at 758. Further, the
cause of action accrues on the date the plaintiff, through the exercise of
due diligence, should have discovered the factual basis for the action,
even if actual discovery did not occur until later. Allen, 118 Wn.2d at
758.
One who has notice of facts sufficient to prompt a person of average
prudence to inquire is deemed to have notice of all facts that reasonable
inquiry would disclose. Green v. A.P.C. (American Pharm. Co.), 136 Wn.2d
87, 100, 960 P.2d 912 (1998); Vigil v. Spokane County, 42 Wn. App. 796,
800, 714 P.2d 692 (1986). When an aggrieved party discovered or could have
discovered the facts to support a cause of action is a question of fact.
Green, 136 Wn.2d at 100; Vigil, 42 Wn. App. at 800.
To prove a wrongful adoption claim, a plaintiff must establish that the
adoption agency breached its statutory duty of disclosure4 and that such
failure to disclose proximately caused plaintiff's damages. See McKinney
v. State, 134 Wn.2d 388, 394-96, 950 P.2d 461 (1998) (recognizing for the
first time that an adoption agency's negligent failure to disclose
information pursuant to RCW 26.33.350 is actionable and may result in
liability). Here, the Prices' cause of action accrued when they knew or
should have known that (1) DSHS failed to disclose at the time of adoption
all of C.'s relevant health history, including the health history of his
biological parents (breach); (2) they would not have adopted C. if they had
known this information (proximate cause); and (3) the adoption of C.
resulted in damages. The cause of action accrued regardless of whether
they knew that these facts established a legal cause of action. Allen, 118
Wn.2d at 758.
The State claims that no later than July 1991, the Prices knew that (1)
DSHS had not disclosed all of C.'s relevant health history at the time of
his adoption; (2) the birth mother had used drugs in the past; (3) fetal
alcohol effect or syndrome was a possible cause of C.'s problems; and (4)
they had incurred substantial costs as a result of C.'s problems. The
Prices contend that they were not on notice until July 1994 of DSHS's
nondisclosure of certain information that would have changed their decision
to adopt. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Prices,
as we must on summary judgment, the record supports the Prices' assertion.
Reynolds, 134 Wn.2d at 495.
Clearly, the Prices knew in 1989, when DSHS disclosed the 16 additional
pages, that in 1981 DSHS did not disclose all of C.'s health history. But
the 1989 information contained nothing about the birth mother's use of
drugs or alcohol during the pregnancy or about the long-term prognosis that
at best, C. would be only "mildly or minimally' disordered" and would
"probably always appear not quite normal."
In 1992, the Prices made "reasonable inquiry" relevant to the issue of
nondisclosure; they requested all files on C. "that relate to his condition
both Physical and Mental before and after his adoption in {1981}." See
Vigil, 42 Wn. App. at 800 (one who has notice of facts sufficient to prompt
a prudent person to inquire is deemed to have notice of all facts
reasonable inquiry would disclose). The State seeks to turn this diligence
against the Prices, contending that it establishes the Prices knew or
should have known that DSHS was continuing to breach its statutory duty to
disclose all information. We disagree.
Arguably, it was not until 1994, when DSHS provided the complete file, that
the Prices knew (1) that DSHS was continuing to breach its statutory duty
to disclose and (2) that DSHS had concealed information that would have
affected their adoption decision, thereby proximately causing their injury.
Thus, reasonable minds could differ about whether, in 1991, the Prices knew
or should have known sufficient facts to connect DSHS's nondisclosure to
their decision to adopt C.
Contrary to the State's argument, evidence that the Prices knew in 1991
that (1) DSHS had breached its duty of disclosure, (2) fetal alcohol effect
or syndrome was a possible cause of C.'s problems, and (3) they had
incurred damages does not provide undisputed evidence that the Prices had
notice of the factual basis of their claim. Although the Prices discovered
previously undisclosed information in 1989, there is evidence that this
information was not critical to their decision to adopt. There also is
evidence that the information first disclosed in 1994 was critical to their
adoption decision.
The hospital records disclosed in 1989 indicate that the birth mother did
not use drugs during pregnancy and are silent about alcohol use. Further,
the letters and reports prepared by C.'s occupational therapist related to
C.'s gross motor delay, which allegedly was the result of under stimulation
and/or malnutrition. DSHS disclosed this information in 1981 when the
Prices adopted C. The letter from C.'s caseworker to Dr. Greff indicated
only that the birth mother "alludes to . . . drug usage in the past."
(Emphasis added.) None of this 1989 information informed the Prices that
the birth mother abused alcohol or drugs during her pregnancy. And
arguably the Prices made reasonable inquiry based on the information they
did have. Vigil, 42 Wn. App. at 800.
The 1994 disclosures revealed the identity of the birth mother's biological
sister. The law then deemed the Prices to have notice of the facts
discoverable upon further inquiry, i.e., that the birth mother abused drugs
and alcohol during pregnancy and that DSHS had this information when the
Prices adopted C. Green, 136 Wn.2d at 96; Vigil, 42 Wn. App. at 800.
The State asks us to disregard the sister's declaration, contending "it is
rife with inadmissible hearsay, improper lay opinions, conclusory
statements, statements made without any foundation for personal knowledge
and speculation." But the law does not define Ketchum's 1981 out-of-court
statements to DSHS as hearsay because the Prices are not offering them for
the truth of the matter asserted but rather to establish that DSHS was on
notice of the biological mother's possible drug and alcohol abuse and
failed to disclose this information to them. ER 801(c). See State v.
Lass, 55 Wn. App. 300, 303-04, 777 P.2d 539 (1989) (out-of-court statements
that are inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted may be
admissible for the more limited purpose of proving notice); see also Silves
v. King, 93 Wn. App. 873, 970 P.2d 790 (1999) (issues of credibility should
not be resolved at summary judgment).
Further, Ketchum's critical testimony relates to her observations of
the mother's drug use and drunken condition during pregnancy and her
testimony that she reported this behavior to DSHS at the time it was first
placing C. in foster care. Ketchum bases these observations of her sister
on personal knowledge; thus, they do not constitute lay opinion testimony
or speculation. See ER 602; 701. See State v. Craven, 69 Wn. App. 581,
586, 849 P.2d 681 (1993) (a lay witness's conclusion regarding another
person's behavior is admissible when prefaced by the witness's recounting
of his or her personal observations that logically and reasonably support
the conclusion).
Upon a close review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Prices, we find genuine issues of material fact as to when the Prices knew,
or through the exercise of due diligence, should have known the facts
relevant to their cause of action. Thus, we reverse the summary judgment
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Seinfeld, J.
We concur:
Morgan, J.
Bridgewater, C.J.
1 At oral argument before this court, the Prices asserted that the adoption
file disclosed in 1994 alerted them for the first time to the existence of
C.'s biological aunt.
2 Responding to the State's motion for summary judgment on the merits, the
Prices conceded that the facts as developed through discovery did not
support a cause of action for breach of contract or fraud. Thus, the only
issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the Prices'
negligence cause of action based on the statute of limitations.
3 RCW 4.16.080 provides in pertinent part: "The following actions shall be
commenced within three years: . . . (2) An action for taking, detaining, or
injuring personal property . . . or for any other injury to the person or
rights of another not hereinafter enumerated."
4 Former RCW 26.36.050 (1979), the adoption disclosure statute in effect in
1981, provided as follows:
Every person, firm, society, association, or corporation receiving,
securing a home for, or otherwise caring for a minor child shall transmit
to the prospective adopting parent prior to placement and shall make
available to all persons with whom a child has been placed by adoption a
complete medical report containing all reasonably available information
concerning the mental, physical and sensory handicaps of said child. Said
report shall not reveal the identity of the natural parents of the child
but shall include any reasonably available mental or physical health
history of the natural parents that needs to be known by the adoptive
parents to facilitate proper health care for the child. RCW 26.36.030 and
26.36.060 {making it a gross misdemeanor to divulge the contents of
adoption records without court order} shall not apply to any information
made available by this section.
In 1984, the Legislature repealed former RCW 26.36.050 and enacted RCW
26.33.350, which stated:
Every person, firm, society, association, or corporation receiving,
securing a home for, or otherwise caring for a minor child shall transmit
to the prospective adopting parent prior to placement and shall make
available to all persons with whom a child has been placed by adoption a
complete medical report containing all reasonably available information
concerning the mental, physical, and sensory handicaps of the child. The
report shall not reveal the identity of the natural parents of the child
but shall include any reasonably available mental or physical health
history of the natural parents that needs to be known by the adoptive
parents to facilitate proper health care for the child.
Laws of 1984, ch. 155, sec. 37.
In 1989, the Legislature enacted RCW 26.33.380, which stated:
Every person, firm, society, association, or corporation receiving,
securing a home for, or otherwise caring for a minor child shall transmit
to the prospective adopting parent prior to placement and shall make
available to all persons with whom a child has been placed by adoption, a
family background and child and family social history report, which
includes a chronological history of the circumstances surrounding the
adoptive placement and any available psychiatric reports, psychological
reports, court reports pertaining to dependency or custody, or school
reports. Such reports or information shall not reveal the identity of the
natural parents of the child.
Laws of 1989, ch. 281, sec. 2.
Following amendments in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1994, RCW 26.33.350 currently
provides:
(1) Every person, firm, society, association, corporation, or state agency
receiving, securing a home for, or otherwise caring for a minor child shall
transmit to the prospective adopting parent prior to placement and shall
make available to all persons with whom a child has been placed by adoption
a complete medical report containing all known and available information
concerning the mental, physical, and sensory handicaps of the child.
(2) The report shall not reveal the identity of the birth parent of
the child except as authorized under this chapter but shall include any
known or available mental or physical health history of the birth parent
that needs to be known by the adoptive parent to facilitate proper health
care for the child or that will assist the adoptive parent in maximizing
the developmental potential of the child.
(3) Where known or available, the information provided shall include:
(a) A review of the birth family's and the child's previous medical
history, including the child's x-rays, examinations, hospitalizations, and
immunizations. After July 1, 1992, medical histories shall be given on a
standardized reporting form developed by the department;
(b) A physical exam of the child by a licensed physician with
appropriate laboratory tests and x-rays;
(c) A referral to a specialist if indicated; and
(d) A written copy of the evaluation with recommendations to the
adoptive family receiving the report.
(4) Entities and persons obligated to provide information under this
section shall make reasonable efforts to locate records and information
concerning the child's mental, physical, and sensory handicaps. The
entities or persons providing the information have no duty, beyond
providing the information, to explain or interpret the records or
information regarding the child's present or future health.
Following amendments in 1993 and 1994, RCW 26.33.380 currently provides:
(1) Every person, firm, society, association, corporation, or state agency
receiving, securing a home for, or otherwise caring for a minor child shall
transmit to the prospective adopting parent prior to placement and shall
make available to all persons with whom a child has been placed by
adoption, a family background and child and family social history report,
which includes a chronological history of the circumstances surrounding the
adoptive placement and any available psychiatric reports, psychological
reports, court reports pertaining to dependency or custody, or school
reports. Such reports or information shall not reveal the identity of the
birth parents of the child but shall contain reasonably available
nonidentifying information.
(2) Entities and person obligated to provide information under this
section shall make reasonable efforts to locate records and information
concerning the child's family background and social history. The entities
or persons providing the information have no duty, beyond providing the
information, to explain or interpret the records or information regarding
the child's mental or physical health.